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## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 29 January 1972*


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*Top Secret*

NSA review completed

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


**1968-1972**  
Weekly average for each month



**OCTOBER 1971 - JANUARY 1972**  
Weekly data as reported




## US BATTLE DEATHS

increased to 5 from the 2 of last week.





## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

decreased slightly from last week's 203 to 194. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

rose to 230 from the 192 of last week.




## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

declined from last week's 954 to 929.



## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces, dropped one point to 95%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

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Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, military activity has increased slightly in the past few days. Some of the fighting may represent the early stages of the enemy's dry season campaign, but much of it has been the result of South Vietnamese initiatives and efforts to disrupt enemy battle preparations.

25X1 [redacted] captured documents concerning the forthcoming Communist military offensive continue to filter in from all parts of South Vietnam. Most of the evidence continues to indicate that the main enemy thrust will be in the central highlands of MR 2 -- although other areas of the country will also be hit -- and that the attacks will begin around Tet (15 February this year). The moon phase pattern for February 1972 would suggest a slightly earlier date. If the Communists decide to launch their attacks at the dark of the moon, the period from 11 through 14 February would be the optimum time.

Most of the 320th NVA Division, which has been moving south since December, probably has now arrived in the central highlands and tri-border area. In addition, there are indications that elements of the 2nd NVA Division are moving south in the Lao panhandle and may be headed for the same area. Since the enemy thus has or soon will have fairly large numbers of troops in the vicinity of the highlands, the progress of his logistical effort over the next several weeks will be a key factor in determining whether he will be able to launch his offensive on schedule or not.

During the past week in Cambodia, enemy-initiated military activity showed an increase after a month-long lull. Heavy mortar fire and ground probes were directed against government positions in the Tonle Toch area and near the town of Prey Veng. The increase in Communist activity in this area may be related to enemy logistical movements recently noted in eastern and southern Kompong Cham Province.

25X1 [redacted] following the withdrawal of the South Vietnamese task force from Krek early in January, the Communists consider Route 7 to be open to them from Chup to Mimot.

The status of friendly forces defending the Long Tieng valley in north Laos remains precarious in spite of a lessening of enemy attacks and the arrival of four fresh, but untried, friendly battalions. Elements of seven enemy regiments are still in the area, five of which have not yet been committed to combat. They may be planning to trap the government irregulars in a static defense situation, and then seek to overwhelm them with an all-out attack. Further north in Laos, an increasing number of small-unit engagements initiated by the enemy culminated in a recoilless rifle attack on Luang Prabang airfield which caused few casualties and little property damage. Elsewhere in Laos, enemy activity was sporadic and light during the week.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

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The number of NVA infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971 now stands at an estimated 70,800 - 72,800, with only some 2,400 added to the count during the week.

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[redacted] In addition to the previously reported high levels of personnel movement toward the central highlands, a sharply increased flow of material toward and through the tri-border area has recently been noted, [redacted]

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[redacted] Rear Services elements in North Vietnam, moreover, are moving 130mm artillery ammunition toward the DMZ where at least four 130mm guns are known to be deployed.

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South Vietnam Developments

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Reaction to the 25 January speeches of President Nixon and President Thieu, and to the Allied eight-point peace plan, has been almost universally favorable among South Vietnamese political leaders. Inevitably, a few political figures in Saigon have commented that the

proposals give too much away to the Communists, and a few have criticized President Thieu for being too subservient to the United States. But the dominant reaction has been one of approval, combined with a belief that the publicizing of the eight-point plan -- on the eve of what is likely to be a major Communist military offensive -- has neatly put the onus on Hanoi for a continuation of the hostilities.

Communist Developments

Hanoi's initial reaction to the publicizing of the allied eight-point peace plan was harshly critical, both in public and in private. In addition to the enemy statements made over Hanoi radio and at the negotiations in Paris, North Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong reportedly took a "totally negative" attitude on the U.S. proposals [redacted]

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[redacted] At the same time, the North Vietnamese have not explicitly rejected the eight-point plan. They are faced, however, with the problem that the publication of their nine-point plan, and the U.S. eight-point plan, clarifies the key issues, particularly that of South Vietnam's political future and how it is to be decided. Over the next few weeks, the North Vietnamese probably will play a holding game in the negotiations, until they can assess the results of the military actions which they appear to be on the verge of launching.

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